INCENTIVES OF INFORMATION PRODUCTION AND DISCLOSURE: COMMENT

Item request has been placed! ×
Item request cannot be made. ×
loading   Processing Request
  • Additional Information
    • Abstract:
      This article presents information on incentives for information production and disclosure. The firms prefer rot to share their information about market demand with their rivals. The prima facie evidence looks as though it should generalize: firms should do better against uninformed than informed rivals. Author Dov Fried's interesting paper forces one to rethink this intuition. By using a linear model, he showed that a duopolist is better off disclosing its costs unless its rival is unable to observe its own costs and the two firms' costs are sufficiently positively correlated. The results are important both for their implications with respect to regulatory agencies and for the light they cast on games of incomplete information. It is therefore interesting to consider whether they will generalize. The explanation for this phenomenon turns on an interesting distinction between types of information. The firm specific information is not necessarily associated with counter-adjustment, nor common information with its converse. More importantly, common information may he disclosed even if it does not give rise to counter-adjustment.
    • Notes:
      Publisher Information: MIT Press.
    • Author Affiliations:
      1Trinity College, Dublin
    • ISSN:
      0033-5533
    • Accession Number:
      4624007
  • Citations
    • ABNT:
      SEIDMANN, D. J. Incentives of Information Production and Disclosure: Comment. Quarterly Journal of Economics, [s. l.], v. 102, n. 2, p. 445–452, [s. d.]. Disponível em: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=sxi&AN=4624007. Acesso em: 8 jul. 2020.
    • AMA:
      Seidmann DJ. Incentives of Information Production and Disclosure: Comment. Quarterly Journal of Economics. 102(2):445-452. https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=sxi&AN=4624007. Accessed July 8, 2020.
    • AMA11:
      Seidmann DJ. Incentives of Information Production and Disclosure: Comment. Quarterly Journal of Economics. 102(2):445-452. Accessed July 8, 2020. https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=sxi&AN=4624007
    • APA:
      Seidmann, D. J. (n.d.). Incentives of Information Production and Disclosure: Comment. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 102(2), 445–452.
    • Chicago/Turabian: Author-Date:
      Seidmann, Daniel J. 2020. “Incentives of Information Production and Disclosure: Comment.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 102 (2): 445–52. Accessed July 8. https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=sxi&AN=4624007.
    • Harvard:
      Seidmann, D. J. (no date) ‘Incentives of Information Production and Disclosure: Comment’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 102(2), pp. 445–452. Available at: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=sxi&AN=4624007 (Accessed: 8 July 2020).
    • Harvard: Australian:
      Seidmann, DJ n.d., ‘Incentives of Information Production and Disclosure: Comment’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 102, no. 2, pp. 445–452, viewed 8 July 2020, .
    • MLA:
      Seidmann, Daniel J. “Incentives of Information Production and Disclosure: Comment.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 102, no. 2, pp. 445–452. EBSCOhost, search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=sxi&AN=4624007. Accessed 8 July 2020.
    • Chicago/Turabian: Humanities:
      Seidmann, Daniel J. “Incentives of Information Production and Disclosure: Comment.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 102, no. 2: 445–52. Accessed July 8, 2020. https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=sxi&AN=4624007.
    • Vancouver/ICMJE:
      Seidmann DJ. Incentives of Information Production and Disclosure: Comment. Quarterly Journal of Economics [Internet]. [cited 2020 Jul 8];102(2):445–52. Available from: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&site=eds-live&db=sxi&AN=4624007